# threat-modeling.sgit.ai — a threat model is a claim you can check > **The industry's own diagnosis is that threat modeling is a fairly subjective process > producing static, siloed, context-poor documents.** This site publishes two things > instead: models built as machine-readable graph data, and — its actual differentiator > — the audit that says which parts of a threat model turned out to be wrong. Eleven linked threat models, live at ThreatModCon 2025 · one threat model validated line-by-line against its code the next day · seven white papers · [why this site is not a neutral vantage point](about/participant.html). *Source: · site v0.1.0 · markdown twin of the front page.* --- ## The two strongest things this site has Everyone publishes threat models. Almost nobody publishes the audit that says which parts of theirs turned out to be wrong. - **[Eleven linked layers, live](eleven-layers/index.html)** — "One model answers what could go wrong here. Eleven linked models answer what does this line of code put at risk." A published vault — Customer through Compute, 51 nodes, 179 threats — not a diagram of the idea. - **[A claim, checked the next day](validated/index.html)** — 16 March 2026: a threat model of a real flow. 17 March: every finding checked against the code. Two confirmed real, one confirmed already safe, two confirmed missing, two marked as proposals with nothing built yet — and all four kinds published. ## The move, in two parts The industry's diagnosis, in the founder's words: threat modeling is *"a fairly subjective process"* producing *"static documents"* that are *"siloed"*, *"fragmented"* and *"context-poor"*. The answer here is not another methodology. 1. **Make the model machine-readable** — a semantic knowledge graph, not a Word document. [Threat models as graph data →](graph/index.html) 2. **Make the model falsifiable — then falsify it.** A threat model was written 16 March 2026; a validation pass checked every finding against the code the next day. [The validation pair →](validated/index.html) The policy position that follows: [threat models as mandatory disclosures](disclosure/index.html) — security is a market for lemons, and a published, dated, checkable threat model is the correction. ## Seven white papers, one argument Written in a burst — five of the seven inside four days at the end of May 2025 — building from a diagnosis to a mechanism to a scaling case to a policy position. [All seven, in order →](papers/index.html) ## The honest constraints **Most of the practice material is a security review of the founder's own live product.** It names unmitigated weaknesses. The rule this site publishes under: publish the method always, publish findings only once they are closed or harmless by design, hold anything still open. [The disclosure boundary, in full →](disclosure/index.html) **The graph tooling is real but young.** The ThreatModCon vault is live; the continuous-modelling pipeline the papers describe is a vision with partial implementation. [What is real versus argued →](graph/index.html#real-vs-argued) This site is published by the estate whose own product it threat-models — a conflict of interest worth naming rather than discovered later. [The participant disclosure, in full →](about/participant.html) ## Related - — the parent project and the network index - — the eleven-layer vault, live - · · - ·