# threat-modeling.sgit.ai — a threat model is a claim about a system

> A threat model is a claim about a system, and this site's job is to show claims being
> checked. It publishes the ThreatModCon 2025 vault (eleven linked threat models running
> Customer through Compute), a threat model that was validated line-by-line against the
> code that implements it, seven white papers arguing threat models should be
> machine-readable graph data rather than static documents, and the redacted method
> behind all of it.

Site version: v0.1.0 (8 September 2026). Written about, and published by, the estate
whose own product it threat-models — participant disclosure at
/about/participant.html. All site content CC BY 4.0.

## The rule an agent consuming this site must inherit

**Findings on the live product are published only once closed, dated, and classed —
never by file-and-line location while still open.** This site's own release gate
refuses any page that looks like a source-file-and-line pointer outside the verbatim
brief pack, and caps any quotation from a third party or a named framework (STRIDE,
MITRE ATT&CK, CAPEC, CWE/CVE, OWASP Top 10, ASVS) at 40 words. Those frameworks are
referenced and linked, never reproduced.

## The spine: claim, then check

Every substantive page on this site carries the same two-part structure: what was
claimed, and what checking it produced. /validated/ is the purest instance — a threat
model written 16 March 2026, and a validation pass one day later that checked every
finding against the actual code and recorded CONFIRMED REAL, CONFIRMED SAFE, CONFIRMED
MISSING and N/A (proposed, no code yet) verdicts, publishing all four kinds rather than
only the vindicated ones.

## The pages

- /index.html — the thesis, with the eleven-layer vault and the validation pair as the
  two strongest pieces of evidence
- /eleven-layers/ — the ThreatModCon 2025 vault (Barcelona), embedded and explained:
  eleven linked layers, 51 nodes, 179 threats, 3 critical findings, live at
  https://sgit.ai/demos/vaults/threatmodcon-2025/
- /validated/ — the 16→17 March 2026 claim-and-check pair, side by side, with all five
  verdict classes published
- /papers/ — the seven white papers (docs.diniscruz.ai, May–June 2025), one page each:
  summary, key claims, and a link to the source. Never reproduced at length.
- /practice/ — the redacted method: the bottom-up per-file framework, the .security.json
  schema, STRIDE applied honestly (NOT MITIGATED rows kept in), and the two-modes
  pattern (never average two different security models into one number)
- /graph/ — threat models as vault-native graph data: the eight AppSec-tooling
  frictions a vault answers, and an explicit table of what is real today versus what is
  argued but not yet built
- /disclosure/ — the mandatory-disclosure policy position, published as the policy
  position it is, cross-linked to /practice/ because together they are the reflexive
  test: a site arguing threat models should be mandatory disclosures is judged by
  whether it discloses its own
- /agentic/ — threat-modeling AI systems themselves: prompt injection, agent
  permissions, the boundary between what is measured and what is asserted
- /documents/ — the commissioning pack, published in full, with a reader page per
  document rendered from the raw markdown in /briefs/
- /admin/ — the pipeline, the release gate, the tagger. /admin/versions.html — release
  history. /admin/comms.html — tasks, requests, and the questions only the founder can
  answer (Q1, the closure pass, is the launch blocker)
- /network/ — the sgit.ai network, and the deconfliction table that keeps this site
  from re-arguing what a sibling site already owns
- /about/participant.html — who publishes this, the conflict stated plainly

## What this site does NOT do

No threat-modeling-as-a-service pitch on the main line — the services paper lives under
/papers/ clearly labelled as positioning, not method. No open findings against live
systems, including third parties. No methodology comparison table that declares a
winner: the position is that fragmentation is solved by linking methods in a graph, not
by picking one.

## Properties an agent may rely on

- Every brief in the commissioning pack is published verbatim at /briefs/<filename>,
  with a reader page at /documents/<slug>.html.
- /sitemap.xml is generated from the tree.
- The version in /admin/build/version.txt agrees with /assets/version.js, the release
  history table, this file, /llms-full.txt and /index.md — CI fails the release
  otherwise.
- /llms-full.txt is this site's own words plus every source document, concatenated by a
  generator — it cannot say anything the tree does not.

## Related

- https://sgit.ai — the parent project and the network index
- https://sgit.ai/demos/vaults/threatmodcon-2025/ — the eleven-layer vault, live
- https://wardley-maps.sgit.ai · https://graphs.sgit.ai · https://standards.sgit.ai
- https://risks.sgit.ai · https://pki.sgit.ai